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I. INTRODUCTION
With seemingly illustrious returns over the past several years, many
government officials and agencies believe that hedge funds have positioned
themselves as the paradigm of investment instrumentality. Hedge funds'
rapid growth in both size and influence has landed over $1 trillion in assets
in over 8,000 funds, gaining the attention and scrutiny of the Securities
Exchange Commission ("SEC").' Hedge fund assets grew approximately
260 percent between 1999 and 2003 alone,2 prompting the SEC to conduct
a review of hedge fund practices and operations.3 But despite the fact that
hedge fund growth slowed significantly in 2004 and 2005 as returns fell
considerably short of investor expectations,4 the SEC maintains that hedge
fund assets will continue to grow and that hedge funds will remain an
increasingly popular investment opportunity for both the sophisticated and
retail investor
Unfortunately for hedge fund advisors who previously thrived on the
anonymity of the industry and its practices, the SEC's interest in hedge
funds was accompanied by increased attention from the media, generating
remarkable commotion over the hedge fund industry. This media coverage
spawned a national fear of the potential effects the growth of these invest-
ments may have on U.S. financial markets.6 And with the highly publicized
failures of several large funds as a result of allegedly questionable trading
practices,7 the SEC resolved to take regulatory action. After completing its
I Brett Duval Fromson, HedgeFunds Today, Fortunes Favor the Brave, WALL ST.J., Nov. 22,2005,
at A14.
2 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisors
Act Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72054-01 (Dec. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Investment Advisors Act
Release].
3 SEC STAFF REPORT, IMPLICATIONS OFTHEGROWrH OF HEDGE FUNDS (2003) [hereinafter
SEC REPORT].
4 Hedge fund growth in 2004 and 2005 was reported at 9% and 9.2% respectively. See
Bloomberg.com, Hedge Funds Gained 9.2% in 2005 After Slow First Half,
http//quote.bloomberg.con/apps/news?pid= 10000006&sid=a7XesFzLwEWs&refer=home# (last
visited Oct. 23, 2006).
5 Investment Advisors Act Release, supra note 2.
6 See Steven Rattner, Don't Fence in Hedge Funds, BUS. WK., Jan. 16, 2006, at 104.
7 See Justin Hibbard & Adrienne Carter, Another Fishy Hedge Fund, Bus. WK., Oct. 13, 2005
(detailing the collapse of Wood River Capital Management). See also Daniel Kadlec, Watch Out, They
Bite!, TIME, Nov. 9,2005 (explaining the collapse of the broker Refco and the demise of hedge funds as
a result); Daniel Fisher & Lea Goldman, We Wuz Robbed!, FORBES, Dec. 12,2005 at 166 (discussing the
failures ofboth Wood River Capital Management and Bayou Management); InvestorProtection Implications
of Hedge Funds: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (2003) (testimony ofWilliam H.
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integral study of the hedge fund industry in 2003,8 the SEC promulgated a
new rule requiring that certain hedge fund advisors register under the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 ("Advisors Act"), seeking to increase disclo-
sure in an industry with little transparency and to oversee an allegedly
growing pool of assets.9 However, in light of the SEC's past inability to
regulate the hedge fund industry, 0 it was unclear whether this rule would
provide the SEC with any real authority to regulate hedge fund practices.
The SEC's efforts finally stalled in June of 2006 when the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated this rule, reasoning that
the SEC exceeded its agency authority and rendering the rule unenforce-
able."
Because it is likely that the SEC will either petition the Supreme Court
or seek an amendment to the Advisors Act from Congress that mirrors the
language of the vacated rule, 2 it is necessary to evaluate the efficacy of the
vacated rule in its attempt to increase disclosure. Accordingly, this article
examines the various safe harbors that have allowed hedge funds and their
advisors to escape federal regulation, evaluates the alleged needs for SEC
oversight over hedge fund practices, and details the inadequacy of the
vacated rule in its attempt to provide the SEC with oversight over the large
pool of assets it sought to regulate. This article then argues that the vacated
rule merely provided alternative parameters for qualifying for exemption
from registration under the Advisors Act, which effectively provided an
incentive for hedge fund advisors to increase investment lockup periods.
Further, this article contends that because all applicable federal securities
regulation provides exemptions easily accessible by hedge funds and their
advisors, market efficiencies will be better served if, going forward, the SEC
focuses on limiting unregistered hedge funds' access to certain markets,
rather than trying to force SEC registration. Effective limitations can be
achieved by further policing the investments in which hedge funds seek to
invest and by preventing certain retail investors from investing in hedge
funds, rather than by attempting to regulate the hedge fund industry directly.
Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter Chairman Donaldson].
8 Joseph C. Long, A Hedge Fund Primer, PRACTISING LAW INST., Aug., 2005, at 233.
9 See Investment Advisors Act Release, supra note 2.
10 See discussion infra Part II.
I Goldstein v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 451 F.3d 873, (D.C. Cir. 2006).
t2 Mitchell S. Eitel, Understanding Complex Financial Institutions, PRACTISING LAw INST., Dec.,
2006, at 717.
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A. Hedge Funds are Difficult to Define
The term hedge fund has no exact legal or market definition,'3 but it
"has developed into a catch-all classification for many unregistered privately
managed pools of capital." 4 Generally speaking, hedge funds are holding
entities of a collection of unregistered securities and other assets that need
not register their securities offerings with the SEC.'S Traditionally, hedge
funds are organized as limited partnerships.' 6 The fund promoter acts as the
general partner and all investors in the fund are issued limited partnership
interests. 7 Once committed to a fund, hedge fund investors have limited
control over their money and are generally required to commit their
investments for fixed periods of time. Typically investors cannot redeem
their investments without prior notice or more than twice a year.'"
Hedge fund advisors, with sole management discretion, have the flexi-
bility to structure their securities offerings in ways that qualify for exemption
from all relevant federal securities laws. 9 As a result, hedge funds are not
subject to the diversification requirements or borrowing and leverage restric-
tions with which other registered investment companies must comply.0
Accordingly, hedge funds may specialize in a limited number of investments
or utilize extensive leverage in their investment strategy. This freedom may
assist managers in achieving above average returns, but it can also increase
investors' vulnerability to market fluctuations.2'
Hedge funds profit by using a myriad of investment strategies and
techniques to achieve maximum returns, making it difficult to limit hedge
funds to any set of distinct characteristics.' The only consistent, historic
similarity between funds has been their fee structure, generally providing for
management fees of approximately 2% of fund assets and 20% of fund
profits. 23 It is important to note, however, that hedge fund managers are
13 Pete S. Michaels & Derek C. Anderson , A Case Study of Two Hedge Funds: A Regulatory
Framework and its Lessons for the Broker-Dealer Litigation, PRACTISING LAW INST., Aug., 2005, at 259.
14 Long, supra note 8, at 235 (quoting SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson).
Is See discussion infra Part 11A
16 Long, supra note 8, at 235.
17 Id.
1s Chairman Donaldson, supra note 7, at 2.
19 See discussion infra Part II.
20 Chairman Donaldson, supra note 7, at 2-3.
21 Id.
22 Investment Advisors Act Release, supra note 2, at 72055.
2 Dave Kansas, Making Sense of Wall Street; As Investment Choices Pile Up, Grasping Fundamentals
is Key; Hedge-Fund Boom Explained, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2006, at B1.
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only paid when they return a profit, unlike mutual fund managers who take
fees regardless of the bottom line.24 This fee structure creates a subcon-
scious regime of self-regulation, providing an incentive for hedge fund
managers to proactively pursue investments with a greater potential rate of
return while still ensuring appropriate due diligence by providing for the
non-payment of compensation when managers produce negative returns.
Thus, where other investments may require SEC regulation to mandate
thorough due diligence investigation by managers, hedge funds' fee structure
inherently provides this protection.
II. HEDGE FUNDS OPERATE OUTSIDE OF
FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION
Hedge funds' flexible structure, limited investor group and
predisposition to private offerings have permitted the majority of hedge
funds and their advisors to escape registration under the federal securities
laws. The relevant exemptions from the federal securities laws are detailed
below.
A. Hedge Fund Securities Are Not Regulated by the Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") demands full and fair
disclosure in the public distribution of securities by requiring issuers to
register with the SEC.' Hedge funds forced to register their securities under
the Act would be subject to a panoply of disclosure requirements and SEC
scrutiny effectuated by the distribution of a registration statement and
prospectus.26 However, hedge fund securities are typically sold through
private offerings and subsequently avoid registration under the Securities Act.
Circumventing registration with the SEC allows hedge funds to offer
securities without providing the SEC with anything more than the names
and addresses of the funds' owners.27
Hedge fund securities are generally issued in the form of limited
partnership interests2' and fall within the definition of a security, pursuant
24 Id.
25 JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter SECURITIES REGULATION].
26 Id.
27 Securities that qualify for exemption under Section 4(2) are required to file a Form D with
the SEC after issuing securities.
28 See discussion supra Part I.
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to Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act. 29 Accordingly, hedge funds would
be required to comply with the strict disclosure requirements set forth in
Section 5 of the Securities Act but for the private offering exemption
provided in Section 4(2) of the Act and Rule 506 of Regulation D.3"
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act provides that "the provisions of Section
5 shall not apply to... transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering."3M A hedge fund can be assured the protections of a Section 4(2)
exemption by satisfying the following provisions provided for in Rule 506
of Regulation D: (1) the fund cannot utilize general solicitation or
advertising in marketing its securities; (2) the fund can only sell its securities
to "accredited investors"32 and up to 35 other purchasers (who must possess
sufficient financial and business knowledge and experience in order to
evaluate the risks associated with the fund); (3) the fund advisor must be
available for questions from prospective purchasers; and (4) the securities
issued by the fund cannot be redeemed for at least a year after purchase and
cannot be resold.33
Further, Rule 506 explicitly states, in addition to the aforementioned
standards, that to qualify for exemption, an issuer must comply with the
requirements set forth in Rule 502 of Regulation D.34 Rule 502 provides that
if an issuer sells its securities to any purchaser that is not an accredited
investor, the issuer must furnish the purchaser with non-financial
information material to an understanding of the business and of the
securities being offered, as well as any relevant financial statements and the
information contained therein.35
29 SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 23, at 46.
30 SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-14.
31 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A S 77a (2005).
32 Interpreting rule 501, the SEC REPORT defines accredited investor as:
Individuals who have a net worth, orjoint worth with their spouse, above $1,000,000, or have
income above $200,000 in the last two years (or joint income with their spouse above
$300,000) and a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the year of
investment; or are directors, officers or general partners of the hedge fund or its general
partner; and
Certain institutional investors, including: banks; savings and loan associations;
registered brokers, dealers and investment companies; licensed small business investment
companies; corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies and business trusts with
more than $5,000,000 in assets; and many, if not most, employee benefit plans and trusts with
more than $5,000,000 in assets.
SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
i3 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Rule 506 of Regulation D, available at
http;//www.sec.gov /answers/ rule506.htm.
M Rule 506 under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. S 230.506 (2005).
35 Rule 502(b) under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. S 230.502(b) (2005).
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Accordingly, hedge funds typically only allow "accredited investors" to
purchase their securities36 and require these investors to commit their
investment for a minimum of one year. Even though hedge funds are not
required to comply with the conditions set forth in Rule 506 to qualify for
exemption under Section 4(2), compliance with this rule guarantees the
availability of the exemption.37 Thus, hedge funds generally complywith the
requirements of Rule 506 to ensure that their offerings are not subject to the
disclosure requirements of the Securities Act. 38
B. Hedge Funds Avoid the Continuous Disclosure Requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") seeks to
achieve efficient trading on national markets through the continuous
disclosure of material information.39 Hedge fund securities generally fall
outside of the parameters of the Exchange Act, which allows hedge funds to
avoid compliance with the Act's continuous disclosure requirements.
Generally, continuous disclosure is required for three types of companies:
(1) those with securities listed on a national securities exchange pursuant to
Section 12(b); (2) those with assets in excess of $10 million and a class of
equity securities held by at least 500 persons pursuant to Section 12 (g); and
(3) companies with an effective registration statement under the Securities
Act filed pursuant to Section 15(d). 40
The SEC requires the aforementioned types of companies to register
their securities and make periodic filings regarding their financial position
and material business developments through Forms 10K, 10Q and 8K 41
Because hedge fund securities are not listed on any national security
exchange and generally avoid registration under the Securities Act,42 hedge
funds merely need to limit the number of investors they allow to purchase
securities in order to avoid the disclosure requirements imposed by the
Exchange Act.43 The SEC staff report on the implications of hedge fund
growth provides:
36 SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
37 Id.
38 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 31.
39 SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 23, at 7.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 8.
42 See discussion infra Part II.A.
43 SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 18.
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Section 12 (g) and Rule 12g-1 thereunder require that an issuer
having 500 holders of record of a class of equity security (other than
an exempted security) and assets in excess of $10 million at the end
of its most recently ended fiscal year register the equity security
under the Exchange Act. Registration of a class of equity security
subjects domestic registrants to the periodic reporting requirements
of Section 13, proxy requirements of Section 14 and insider
reporting and short swing profit provisions of Section 16 of the
Exchange Act."
Again, even though hedge funds generally issue securities in the form of
limited partnership interests that fall within the definition of a security
under the Exchange Act,45 hedge funds can easily escape the parameters of
the Exchange Act by capping holders of record at 499, while still managing
an unlimited pool of assets.' Thus, hedge funds seeking to avoid the
continuous disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act simply avoid listing
their securities on any national exchange, refrain from registering their
securities offerings under to the Securities Act, and limit the number of
investors to 499.
C. Hedge Funds Circumvent the Regulations Under the Investment Company
Act of 1940
Hedge funds can easily manipulate their corporate form to avoid the
regulations of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "Investment
Company Act"). While hedge funds may fall within the meaning of
"investment company" as defined by the Investment Company Act,47 both
44 Id.
45 The definition of a security under the Exchange Act and the Securities Act are sufficiently
similar. See discussion supra Part IIA
46 SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-19. For a discussion ofthe minimal disclosure requirements
that may be applicable to hedge funds pursuant to section 13 (g) of the Exchange Act, see SEC REPORT,
supra note 3, at 19.
4 15 U.S.C.A. S 80a-3(a)(1) (2005) defines an investment company as any issuer which:
(A) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the
business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(B) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount certificates of the
installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has any such certificate
outstanding; or
(C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning,
holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having
HEDGE FUNDS
Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) provide exemptions that allow hedge funds to
escape regulation.'
Section 3 (c) (1) exempts an issuer from regulation when its securities are
neither beneficially owned by more than 100 investors nor issued through
a public offering. Section 3(c)(7) exempts an issuer from the regulation
when its securities are wholly owned by "qualified purchasers" as defined by
Section 2(a)(51)49 and not issued through a public offering. By providing
this exemption, it appears that Congress is of the opinion that extremely
sophisticated investors understand and appreciate the risks associated with
hedge funds and do not require the protections afforded by the Investment
Company Act.50
It is important to note that a hedge fund qualifying for exemption
pursuant to Section 3(c)(7) is not subject to the 100-investor limitation.
Accordingly, these funds are permitted to accept investments from an
infinite number of qualified purchasers. However, in order to maintain
exemption from the Exchange Act, most hedge funds relying on Section
3(c)(7) still cap investors at 499.5
D. The SEC Fails to Command Hedge Fund Advisor Registration Under the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940
Hedge fund advisors have historically avoided the regulations under the
Advisors Act. As a result, in December of 2004, the SEC attempted to
mandate hedge fund advisor registration with the SEC under the Advisors
Act by adopting amendments to Rule 203(b)(3)-1 and creating Rule
203(b)(3)-2 (collectively, the "Vacated Rule"). s2
Generally speaking, hedge fund advisors qualify as "investment advisors"
within the meaning of the Advisors Act. Section 202(a)(11) defines an
investment advisor as:
a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of
Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.
48 SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-12.
49 15.U.S.C.A. S 80a-2(a)(51) (2005) generally defines a qualified purchaser as (1) any natural
person who owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments, (2) any company that owns not less than
$5,000,000 in investments and that is owned by 2 or more persons who are related as siblings or spouse,
(3) any other trust that was not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, where
the trustee and each settlor is deemed a qualified purchaser, or (4) any person, acting for its own account
or the accounts of other qualified purchasers, who in the aggregate owns and invests $25,000,000 or more
in investments.
so SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 30.
51 See discussion infa Part II.B.
52 See Investment Advisors Act Release, supra note 2.
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Any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or writings,
as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as
part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports
concerning securities.5 3
Section 203A(a)(1)(A) requires investment advisors who have $25
million or more in assets under management to register under the Act.54
Accordingly, hedge fund advisors with at least $25 million in assets under
management are required to register with the SEC.5 Pursuant to the
regulations, registered investment advisors must maintain certain business
records, provide clients with a disclosure statement and implement
compliance procedures to prevent violations of the Act. 56
a. THE HEDGE FUND ADVISOR EXEMPTION
Despite the fact that hedge fund advisors qualify as investment advisors
pursuant to Section 202(a) (11) and thus should be subject to the regulations
under the Advisors Act, Section 203(b) of the Advisors Act exempts from
registration "investment advisors who: (i) have advised fewer than 15 clients
during the preceding 12 months, (ii) do not hold themselves out generally
to the public as an investment advisor and (iii) do not serve as an investment
advisor to a registered investment company."57 Prior to the SEC's adoption
of the Vacated Rule and now after the decision in Goldstein v. SEC,58
Section 203(b) permits investment advisors to count a hedge fund as a single
client for purposes of the 203(b) safe harbor, regardless of the number of
limited partnership interests sold in the fund. Consequently, hedge fund
advisors are permitted to manage up to 14 hedge funds without registering
with the SEC, controlling the investments of an unlimited number of
investors holding limited partnership interests in the various funds.59
53 15 U.S.CA § 80b- 2(a)(11) (2005).
54 15 U.S.CA S 80b-3a(a)(1)(A) (2005) (stipulating that this asset minimum only applies to
advisors whose principal place of business is in the United States).
55 Id.
% Investment Advisors Act Release, supra note 2, at 72054.
57 SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.
s8 Goldstein v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 451 F.3d 873, (D.C. Cir. 2006).
59 Id.
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b. THE HEDGE FuND ADVISOR EXEMPTION UNDER THE VACATED
RULE
The SEC specifically sought to close the extensive loophole that
counting hedge funds as a single client provides and increase the number of
hedge fund advisors required to register under the Advisors Act. By
enacting the Vacated Rule, the SEC sought to change the counting method
that hedge fund advisors currently use to qualify for the private advisor
exemption under Section 203(b). °  The Vacated Rule required an
investment advisor to "look through" a private fund and count each owner
of the fund toward the threshold of fourteen clients regardless of whether
the owner of the fund was a shareholder, limited partner, member, or
beneficiary of the private fund.6" Where a hedge fund advisor is currently
permitted to count each hedge fund as one client, the Vacated Rule required
an advisor to count each owner of any hedge fund security as one client to
determine whether she qualified for the exemption under 203(b).
However, the Vacated Rule failed to close the loophole completely. The
language of the Vacated Rule explicitly required "look through" counting
only for advisors of private funds. Consequently, hedge fund advisors
would have only needed to utilize "look through" counting for purposes of
the exemption if their hedge fund qualified as a private fund pursuant to
203 (b) (3)-1.62 Ifa particular hedge fund would not constitute a private fund,
the Vacated Rule would not require the advisor to look through the business
form and thus would not require the advisor to utilize this new method of
counting clients.
The Vacated Rule provided that a hedge fund would not qualify as a
private fund unless it is a company that: (1) relies on either Section 3(c)(1)
or Section 3 (c) (7) of the Investment Company Act to avoid regulation there
under,63 (2) allows investors to redeem their security interests in the fund
within two years of purchase and, (3) offers its security interests based on
the investment advisor's skills, ability or expertise. 64 Because the Vacated
Rule dictated that only those funds allowing investors to redeem their
security interests within two years of purchase qualify as private funds, it
60 Investment Advisors Act Release, supra note 2, at 72065.
61 17 C.F.R. S 275.203(b)(3)-2 (2006).
62 If an advisor advises individual clients directly in addition to investors in a private fund, the
advisor must count those individuals as well as the private fund clients as clients for purposes of
determining whether the advisor meets the threshold under 203(b)(3). See id.
63 See Investment Advisors Act Release, supra note 2. See also discussion infra Part II.C.
6 17 C.F.R. S 275.203(b)(3)-l(d) (2006).
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effectively provided a safe harbor from the "look through" counting method.
An advisor seeking to avoid the "look through" counting requirement could
have simply increased the investment lockup period in the fund to two years.
Consequently, rather than limiting the availability of the private advisor
exemption, the SEC effectively provided an incentive for hedge fund
advisors to increase their lockup periods. By conditioning the exemption on
a two-year lockup period, the SEC gave hedge fund advisors a choice: either
register with the SEC or increase their lockup period.65 If a hedge fund
advisor chose to increase the lockup period in her fund to over two years,
the advisor could continue to count the fund as one client under the private
advisor exemption and would have experienced the same regulatory freedom
she currently enjoys.
III. THE SEC's FEARS OF GROWTH, FRAUD, AND RETAILIZATION
UNDERLYING THE ADOPTION OF THE VACATED RULE ARE
UNFOUNDED
Despite the fact that hedge funds and their advisors generally avoid
registration with the SEC, they have been, and continue to be, subject to the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. These laws allow the
SEC to file suit for misappropriation of assets, misrepresentation of portfolio
performance, falsification of experience, credentials and past returns,
misleading disclosures regarding claimed trading strategies, and improper
valuation of assets.66 In fact, the SEC has brought over 51 enforcement
actions in the last five years, 38 of which were filed between January 2004
and the middle of October 2005, asserting that hedge fund advisors
defrauded investors or used the fund to defraud others.67 Because of the
recent increase in enforcement actions, the SEC contends that the anti-fraud
provisions alone do not provide sufficient protection from or deterrence of
fraudulent behavior.
68
In September of 2003, the SEC completed a detailed investigation of the
hedge fund industry.69 This staff report outlined the operation of hedge
funds and introduced several public policy concerns. In this report and in
the reasoning behind the subsequent adoption of the Vacated Rule, the SEC
maintained the position that hedge funds are a danger to the stability of the
U.S. financial markets and subject investors to inordinately high levels of
65 See discussion infra Part IV.
66 See Investment Advisors Act Release, supra note 2, at 72062-63.
67 Kit R. Roane, Hedge Funds Get Clipped, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 9,2006, at 49.
68 See Investment Advisors Act Release, supra note 2, at 72062-63.
69 See SEC REPORT, supra note 3.
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risk.7" The SEC predicated this belief primarily on its inability to detect
fraud in its early stages due to a lack of transparency in the industry and its
inability to examine and monitor unregistered hedge fund advisors.7' The
SEC alleged that, if given the opportunity to continuously monitor and
examine the practices of hedge fund advisors, it would effectively detect
fraud and misconduct at much earlier stages, deter fraudulent activities,
better protect the investing public, and increase the quality and fairness of
hedge fund price valuation.72 Consequently, in an effort to acquire access
to hedge fund practices, the SEC adopted the Vacated Rule, expecting that
a majority of hedge fund advisors would be forced to register under the
Act.
73
A. The SEC's Fear of Rapid Growth are Outdated
Injustifying the Vacated Rule, the SEC expressed concern regarding the
rapid growth of the hedge fund industry and the impact this growth could
have on the U.S. securities markets. At the time the Vacated Rule was
adopted, the growth of hedge funds was on the rise. Despite the fact that
overall hedge fund assets merely constituted a fifth of total mutual fund
assets, the SEC assumed that cash flows into hedge funds would continue
to rapidly increase and that hedge fund advisors would become even bigger
market participants than their mutual fund counterparts, controlling an
infinitely large pool of assets. Accordingly, the SEC asserted that its
oversight was necessary to monitor an industry that was poised to account
for a significant portion of market trading in the imminent future.
However, with the extensively publicized exposure of fraudulent
practices and the subsequent collapse of several large hedge funds,74 it is of
no surprise that the stunning growth of the hedge fund industry has lost a
significant amount of its momentum. Net cash flows into hedge funds
actually dropped 44% in the third quarter of 2005 compared to the third
quarter of 2004.7s And as these cash flows dried up, so did a number of
hedge funds themselves. 848 hedge funds closed their doors in 2005,
representing more than 11% of the overall U.S. industry at the onset of that
70 Id. See also Investment Advisors Act Release, supra note 2.
71 See SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 76-80.
72 Id.
73 See discussion infa Part II.D.
74 See supra note 7.
75 Aaron Pressman, Hedge Funds: The Pool Is Shrinking, Bus. WK., Jan. 30, 2006, at 32.
2006]
126 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:113
year.76 This trend has continued in 2006 and will likely continue through
2007.7
The decline in the cash flows and the closure of numerous hedge funds
seems to evidence the market's minimal tolerance for fraudulent activities,
proving that securities markets have some ability to regulate themselves
without the interference of the SEC. The decline in cash flows also
indicates that the SEC's scrutiny over hedge fund practices may not be
necessary, as investors have seemingly punished the hedge fund industry for
its abuses by pursuing other investments. While the SEC may have believed
that the hedge fund industry would experience continuous growth based on
prior predictions, investors are clearly seeking alternative investment
options. Consequently, the SEC can no longer rely on hedge fund growth
as a predicate for increased regulation as market statistics clearly indicate a
reduction in the number of operative hedge funds.7
B. The SEC's Fear of Fraud on Collateral Investors Cannot be Solely
Attributed to Unregistered Hedge Fund Advisors
Further, as an alternative justification for the Vacated Rule, the SEC
expressed a need to protect investors from hedge fund advisors who have not
only defrauded their own investors, but who have used funds to defraud
additional market participants. 79 According to the Vacated Rule release,
some mutual fund investors have fallen prey to hedge fund advisors utilizing
late trading and market timing strategies to bump up returns from mutual
funds at the expense of other mutual fund investors, strategies that are both
difficult to detect and in contravention of the law.' In several SEC actions,
hedge fund advisors were sanctioned for collaborating with mutual fund
advisors to achieve high returns, offering to invest in other funds managed
by a particular mutual fund advisor in exchange for a waiver of restrictions
on market timing."
However, it is important to note that the SEC has sanctioned both hedge
fund advisors and mutual fund advisors for engaging in these types of
transactions.82 Despite the fact that the SEC has extensive scrutiny over
76 Anita Raghavan ET. AL., Despite Blue-Chip Gains, Hedge Funds Increasingly Are Faltering and
Closing, WALL ST.J., Oct. 4, 2006, at Cl.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Investment Advisors Act Release, supra note 2, at 72056-57.
so Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 72057.
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mutual fund practices, 3 it was only able to detect these fraudulent trading
activities after they had occurred." Accordingly, the SEC cannot blame
these conspiracies solely on the fact that it was unable to monitor and
scrutinize unregistered hedge funds, as the SEC has ample discretion to
investigate and monitor mutual fund practices pursuant to the Investment
Company Act, giving the SEC ample opportunity to uncover these types of
transactions. It is unclear why the SEC believes that by requiring hedge
fund advisors to register under the Advisors Act, it will be able to detect
these same fraudulent activities it failed to discover in its regulation of
mutual funds. The Vacated Rule would not provide the SEC with any
additional monitoring ability over these types of trading activities; it merely
parallels the SEC's existing ability to monitor these activities pursuant to
mutual fund registration. Because the Vacated Rule fails to provide any
additional protection in the context of market timing conspiracies between
mutual fund advisors and hedge fund advisors, the SEC cannot predicate the
adoption of the Vacated Rule on the basis that it will aid the SEC in
generally detecting fraud against innocent mutual fund investors.
C. The SEC's Fear of Retailization Fails to Account for the Financial
Sophistication of Institutional Investment Managers
Finally, the SEC's leading concern is that "a growing number of public
and private pension funds, as well as universities, endowments, foundations,
and other charitable organizations, have begun to invest in or have increased
their allocations to hedge funds." 5 The SEC fears that participation in
hedge fund investing by these entities will expose the beneficiaries of these
organizations to increased risk and potentially major losses resulting from
insufficient strategies or fraud, thus preventing some entities from satisfying
their obligations to beneficiaries.8s Accordingly, the SEC contends that
beneficiaries who depend on these investments for financial stability are
more vulnerable to the current risks associated with hedge funds and require
the protections provided by hedge fund advisor registration and SEC
oversight.
However, the SEC fails to take into consideration the experience and
financial sophistication of the investment managers employed by
83 Mutual funds are required to register with the SEC under the Investment Company Act. See
Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman & Carla G. Teodoro, The ABCs of Mutual Funds, PRACTISING LAW INST.,
July 2005, at 9.
84 Investment Advisors Act Release, supra note 2.
85 Id. at 72057-58.
86 Id.
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institutional investors. Because institutional investments generally account
for large pools of capital, the managers of these investments tend to be
seasoned investment advisors. s7 Accordingly, these managers possess the
skills necessary to differentiate between superior and inferior investments
and have the education and experience required to evaluate the risks
associated with different investment options.88 Further, many of these
managers are required to perform significant due diligence in selecting
investments mandated by law and can be subject to liability for failure to
exercise sound judgment.s9 As a result, managers of institutional investors
demand to see business plans, financial statements, pro forma statements and
other relevant information when considering an investment and thus should
be able to detect any blatant-and possibly even latent-signs of fraudulent
activity. At the very least, these seasoned investment advisors are able to
understand valuation principals and investment strategies and can reject a
potential hedge fund investment if the valuation information provided is
inadequate or the trading strategies appear too risky.
In addition, the recent decline in performance coupled with the
excessive fees charged by hedge fund managers has led many institutional
investors to redeem hedge fund investments. 90 Many institutional investors
are more reluctant to place any assets in hedge funds and are now pursuing
"more promising areas such as timber, oil and gas, and distressed debt."9'
Thus, with the current investment trend among institutional investors
moving away from hedge fund investing, the SEC cannot maintain that the
alleged rapid retailization of hedge funds necessitates SEC oversight,
especially when institutional investment managers have comparable, if not
superior, investment expertise compared to SEC staff members.
IV. THE VACATED RuLE FAILS TO PROVIDE THE SEC WITH
INCREASED OVERSIGHT OVER HEDGE FuND ADVISORS
Pursuant to the Vacated Rule, the SEC provided investment advisors
one year to bring their activities in compliance with the rule, requiring that
hedge fund advisors who met the requirements of the Vacate Rule register
with the SEC no later than February 10, 2006. But as the deadline for
compliance approached, several of the largest hedge funds refused to
register, contending that "the additional administrative burden of SEC
87 SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 23, at 270.
88 Id.
89 See Employment Retirement Income Security Program 29 U.S.C. SS 1001-1461 (2000)..
90 Pressman, supra note 72.
91 TA
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registration [could] result in a distraction to senior management with no
discernible benefit to [their] investors. " 92
Fearing that SEC examiners lack a sufficient understanding of hedge
fund trading strategies and that the SEC audit following registration would
be overly burdensome for traders and management, a large number of hedge
funds capitalized on the loophole provided by the Vacated Rule. 93 Because
the Vacated Rule only required registration by hedge fund advisors who
allow investors to redeem their investments within two years,94 a large
number of hedge funds merely increased their lockup period to two years
in order to avoid registration. 9 Hedge fund advisors who actively avoided
registration voiced concerns about the burdensome cost of compliance,
fearing that fulfillment of the SEC requirements could cost over $500,000.9
It was estimated that 15% to 20% of hedge-fund advisors would not
register with the SEC.97 And even though 80% of then existing hedge funds
advisors filed for registration, some of the largest funds managing a majority
of hedge fund assets, including SAC Capital Management LLC, Kingdon
Capital Management LLC, GLG Partners LP and Lone Pine Capital LLC
had no intention of following suit.98 Thus, the Vacated Rule failed to
provide the SEC with the control over the extensive pool of assets it sought
to gain, regardless of the fact that a number of hedge funds actually
registered. Rather than generally mandating hedge fund advisor registration,
the SEC merely created an alternative safe harbor allowing hedge fund
advisors to continue to escape registration under the Advisors Act.99
Because the Vacated Rule, as drafted, created an incentive for hedge
fund advisors to increase lockup periods in order to continue to operate
outside of SEC scrutiny, investors' ability to redeem funds to defend
themselves against inadequate performance had been significantly limited.
Investors, who previously were able to redeem funds after just a year if
unsatisfied with hedge fund management, would be forced to hold
investments for at least two years, potentially subjecting these investors to
greater losses. These investors would not only be at the mercy of
unregistered hedge fund advisors, but they would also be exposed to market
fluctuations for an even greater period of time.
92 Gregory Zuckerman& Ian McDonald, Hedge Funds Avoid SEC Registration Rule, WALL ST.J.,
Nov. 10, 2005, at Cl.
93 Id.
94 See discussion infra Part II.D.b.
9s Zuckerman & McDonald, supra note 89.
% Id.
97 Kara Scannell, Making Hedge Funds Less Secret, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2006, at C 1.
9 Id.
99 See discussion infra Part II.D.b.
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V. A BETTER WAY TO ALLEVIATE THE CONCERNS ASSOCIATED
wITH HEDGE FUNDS
Hedge funds that opt to keep their trading practices secret and that are
unwilling to voluntarily comply with the federal securities laws have shown
that there is no easy solution to increase transparency into hedge fund
practices. Limited investor pools and structural elasticity provide hedge
funds with the flexibility necessary to adjust to the varying safe harbor
provisions provided for in all the of the federal securities laws,"° as
evidenced by those hedge fund advisors who increased their investment
lockup periods to two years to avoid compliance with the Vacated Rule.
Justice Brandeis is renowned for his insight on the need for transparency
in the securities markets, advocating that "sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants."'0 ' But when the federal securities laws repeatedly fail to
provide sufficient transparency, such deficiencies necessitate an alternative
solution to investor protection. Rather than slowly chipping away at the
barriers to hedge fund transparency, the SEC would better serve market
efficiencies by further regulating those investments in which hedge funds
seek to invest and further restricting the types of investors permitted to
invest in hedge funds.
First, if the SEC seeks to eliminate hedge fund advisors' ability to
perpetrate fraud against mutual fund investors through the use of market
timing, the SEC should regulate these advisors' access to mutual fund
investments, rather than trying to force all hedge fund advisors to register
with the SEC. The SEC could adopt a new rule under the Investment
Company Act that effectively prevents entities that qualify for the Section
3(c)1 or Section 3(c)7 exemptions'0 2 from investing in both open- and
closed-ended registered investment companies (mutual funds). This
proposed rule could further provide that an entity qualifying for either
exemption may be permitted to invest in a registered investment company
only if the investment advisor of the entity registers with the SEC under the
Advisors Act. This language would effectively limit mutual fund
investments to those hedge fund advisors that register with the SEC. While
the Vacated Rule adopted by the SEC attempted to force registration upon
hedge fund advisors with little success, this proposed rule would create an
incentive for hedge fund advisors to proactively register with the SEC by
100 See discussion infa Part IV.
101 See Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(Frederick A. Stokes Company ed., 1914) (1913).
102 See discussion infa Part II.C.
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conditioning access to mutual fund investments on SEC registration. If
hedge fund advisors continue to refuse to register with the SEC, this
proposed rule would nevertheless protect mutual fund investors from the
alleged fraudulent activities of unregistered hedge fund advisors by
eliminating their ability to invest in mutual funds.
Alternatively, the SEC could further limit the types of investors
permitted to invest in hedge funds. In order to shelter pension funds,
universities, endowments, foundations, and other charitable organizations
from the purportedly higher risks of hedge fund investing, the SEC could
simply eliminate these entities' ability to invest in unregistered funds. The
SEC could add language to the Investment Company Act that eliminates the
availability of the Section 3(c)1 or Section 3(c)7 exemptions 3 to those
investment companies that permit any pension, endowment or other
charitable organization to purchase its securities. Even if this approach
seemingly discriminates against institutional investors, in light of the hedge
fund industry's poor performance and decreasing popularity among
institutional investors," it seems unlikely that institutional investors would
oppose this solution. Because a hedge fund would lose its ability to sell its
securities to institutional investors if it did not register with the SEC under
the Investment Company Act, this proposed rule would also create an
incentive for hedge funds to register with the SEC to increase their potential
investor pool.
Both suggested rules eliminate the concerns identified by the SEC in its
Vacated Rule release without forcing hedge fund registration with the SEC.
While neither rule may increase the SEC's ability to regulate hedge funds
directly, both suggested rules do foreclose unregistered hedge funds' access
to certain markets in which they have previously thrived. Thus,
unregistered hedge funds would be at a disadvantage compared to registered
funds.
VI. CONCLUSION
The comparatively higher returns that hedge funds historically produced
were actually the cause of much ado about nothing in the securities arena.
Because the flexible structure of hedge funds, their abstinence in public
securities offerings, and their limited investor pools have allowed the
majority of hedge funds and their advisors to avoid the mandates of the
federal securities laws and SEC registration, the industry has enjoyed
1o3 See discussion infa Part I.C.
104 Pressman, supra note 75.
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operating in an environment free from SEC oversight. But the recent
publicity surrounding the fraudulent activities of a few established hedge
funds generated an unwarranted fear of a market collapse and ultimately
caused the SEC to enact the Vacated Rule. The SEC feared that the hedge
fund industry's rapid growth in size, influence, and appeal to retail investors
would leave an extensive pool of assets unregulated, adopting the Vacated
Rule in an attempt to gain oversight over the industry. The SEC alleged that
if given the opportunity to continuously monitor and examine the practices
of hedge fund advisors, it would effectively detect fraud and misconduct at
much earlier stages and further deter fraudulent activities.
However, the SEC can no longer rely on hedge fund growth as a
predicate for increased regulation as market statistics clearly prove that hedge
fund growth has stalled. Further, with the current investment trend among
institutional investors moving away from hedge fund investing, the SEC
cannot maintain that the alleged rapid retailization of hedge funds
necessitates SEC oversight, especially when institutional investment
managers have comparable, if not superior, investment expertise.
Nevertheless, even if the SEC's concerns have some merit, the Vacated
Rule fails to provide the SEC with sufficient oversight. Rather than
generally mandating hedge fund advisor registration, the SEC effectively
created an alternative safe harbor that allowed hedge fund advisors to
continue to escape registration under the Advisors Act, as evidenced by the
number of hedge fund advisors who increased investment lockup periods.
Thus, rather than chasing hedge funds and trying to force SEC registration
and disclosure to alleviate concerns, the SEC would better serve investor
interests by regulating those investments in which hedge funds seek to invest
and further restricting the types of investors permitted to invest in hedge
funds.
